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We use French household data to estimate a structural model of female labor supply and use 
of paid child care outside the home. Child care costs are found to have little impact on the 
labor market participation decision of mothers. The model is used to study various policy 
issues. The influence of the current tax credit on child care expenditures on the mothers’ labor 
supply is weak. Suppressing the APE (Parental Allowance for the Education) would cause the 
female participation rate in our sample to rise by 4 points and the proportion of mothers using 
paid care to rise by 2 points. The responses of women to policy changes are very 
heterogenous. Macroeconomic changes in female labor supply are equally due to switches 
between non-participation and participation and switches between working hours by working 
women. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2001, 3,4 million French households had children less than 7 years old and 2 million had 
children under 3. The main financial incentives devoted to them are subsidies to reduce care costs 
and payment of a replacement income to mothers in case of temporary withdrawal from the labor 
market. 
This study aims at modeling the simultaneous decisions of mothers of young children as 
regards labor supply (participation decision and choice of working hours) and use of formal paid 
child care (paid and not underground) outside parents’ home. The model is used to analyze the 
impact of those policies on those decisions. 
 
In a seminal article, Heckman (1974) showed that an increase in child care costs reduces 
both the probability that the mother works and the number of hours supplied when she works. 
Following work has encompassed a large variety of behavioral assumptions and used various data 
sources. However, the impacts of financial constraints on the decisions of mothers as regards 
participation and child care arrangements remain rather poorly known, as no clear consensus 
emerges from the empirical literature. In particular, estimates of elasticities of paid child care use, 
labor market participation and hours worked with respect to child care costs greatly vary along 
studies and conclusions vary quite a lot as regards potential effects of public policies. Moreover, 
comparisons between studies are difficult, due to the use of different fields. 
Cleveland and Hyatt (1993) model the choice of the child care arrangement, conditional 
on the labor market participation of the mother. The options of child care arrangements then play 
a major role. Averett et al. (1997) and Blau and Hagy (1998) distinguish finely between the 
various types of child care. To deal with the endogeneity of employment decisions, Connelly and 
Kimmel (2000) add a participation predictor to the covariates of the discrete choice model for the 
type of child care arrangement. This strategy does not allow to simulate the effect of new 
subsidies to child care costs on female participation. In contrast, Blau and Hagy (1988) and 
Powell (2002) estimate a joint model of participation and use of child care arrangements. Finally, 
Ribar (1995) and Blundell et al. (2000) also model the intensive decision (choice of hours 
worked). 
 
Most of the datasets used in the empirical studies on American and Canadian data include 
unit prices of child care arrangements. An exception is Ribar (1995) whose data comprise total 
expenditures on child care, but no information on either unit price or on quantity. 
All the studies find a significantly positive impact of the mother’s wage on participation
1. 
The elasticities of paid child care costs are also very different across studies. Ribar (1995) 
presents estimates ranging from -0.2 to -0.7. The value is -0.34 according to Blau and Hagy 
(1998). Powell (2002) presents price elasticities of the various child care arrangements of about -
1 for day-care centers and -3 for childminders in their home. Concerning the impact of wages on 
the use of a paid care arrangement, the corresponding elasticity is 0.18 according to Cleveland et 
al. (1996), and ranges from 0.1 to 0.8 in Ribar (1995). Finally, estimates of the elasticity of 
                                                       
1 As an example, estimates of the uncompensated wage elasticity of participation reported by Powell (2002) and 
Ribar (1995) are respectively 0.8 and from 0.1 to 0.5 according to the specification. Averett et al. (1997) present 
estimates of the wage elasticity of the number of hours worked ranging between 1 and 1.5 following the models.   3
participation to child care costs are very variable
2. As regards the elasticity of worked hours, 
Averett et al. (1997) present a high figure of -0.78; in contrast, Michalopoulos et al. (1992) 
estimate this elasticity close to zero. 
We are also interested in results concerning the effects of the U.S. Child and Dependent 
Care Tax Credit (CDCTC), which is the main public device of income assistance to child care in 
the U.S.
3
  since a comparable tax credit exists in France. According to Ribar (1995), the 
suppression of the CDCTC would have a tiny effect on female labor supply, since the 
participation rate of mothers of children less than 15 years old would only drop from 52.6% to 
52.1%. Ribar does not predict massive transitions from full-time to part-time jobs either. On the 
contrary, according to Averett et al. (1997), suppressing the CDCTC would have a big positive 
effect on the number of hours worked by young mothers. One cause of this divergence 
undoubtedly lies in the use of different methodologies and data sources. 
 
From this brief review, it seems that no a priori belief concerning the magnitude of the 
effects of policies implemented in France can be gained from studies made on U.S. data. Turning 
to the French side, two studies may serve as guidelines. Piketty (1998) uses a change in the 
benefit system as a natural experiment to calculate labor supply elasticities of mothers of children 
under 3. In 1994, the Parental Allowance for Education (APE in French), which consists in 
giving a subsidy to parents withdrawing from the labor market until their child reaches the age of 
3, was extended to parents of two children. Among the newly eligible women, a sharp drop in the 
participation rate followed. Piketty (1998) estimates that 17% of the eligible women did drop out 
of the labor force as a consequence of the APE extension. Laroque and Salanié (2000, 2002) 
study the effects of financial incentives on the female labor supply. They use a methodology very 
comparable to ours and also use basically the same data, so that results from the two studies can 
be compared with confidence. However, they do not model child care use, so that we have no 
benchmark as regards estimates involving quantities related to child care. 
 
In this paper, we estimate a structural model of participation, choice of working hours, 
and choice to use paid care outside the parental home, for mothers of children under 7. We use 
data from the 1997 Labor Survey-Tax Return matched sample (see section 2 below). Due to the 
nature of our data, which does not allow for a breakdown of child care expenditures into prices 
and quantities, we rely heavily on Ribar’s (1995) work
4. However, two improvements are made. 
Firstly, we adopt a different parameterization of unobserved heterogeneity, which allows us to 
give a more satisfactory treatment of the observed situations. Secondly, we undertake joint 
estimation of all the equations. It allows us to recover correlations between unobserved tastes and 
residuals in the wage and child care expenditure equations. In comparison to most existing 
studies, our modeling of the tax and benefit system is far more precise. For example, we take into 
account the constraints on the labor supply of women imposed by the existence of a minimum 
wage. This complexity has a reward, since it allows us to examine many policy issues, from a 
change in the schedule of the French Child Care Tax Credit to changes in welfare provisions 
                                                       
2 Blau and Robins (1988), Cleveland et al. (1996), Connelly (1992), Ribar (1995), Powell (1997), Blau and Hagy 
(1998), Michalopoulos and Robins (2000) present estimates that vary from -0.39 to -0.2 following the specifications 
and the fields considered. 
3 Depending on the parents’ income, this subsidy can cover 20% to 30% of the child care expenditures of eligible 
households. See Averett et al. (1997) or Ribar (1995) for more details. 
4 Andrén makes a similar choice for studying the case of single mothers in Sweden.   4
concerning reduction of working time by young mothers. To the best of our knowledge, 
comparable results on French data did not exist before the present study
5. 
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows; section 2 is devoted to the description 
of our data, section 3 presents the main provisions of the French tax and benefit system related to 
child care and labor supply of young mothers and section 4 presents the economic model and the 
econometric specification. Estimation results as well as policy simulations are discussed in 
sections 5 and 6 respectively and section 7 concludes. 
2 The data 
We use the 1997 Labor Force Survey-Tax Return matched sample conducted by Insee and Fiscal 
Services (DGI). These matched data combine the main advantage of the Labor Force Survey, i.e. 
a large representative sample of households with a rich set of demographic descriptors of the 
households for March 1997 and March 1998, to detailed information on the household’s 
members’ taxable incomes in the tax returns. The latter also contain information on child care 
expenditures during the year 1997 which are eligible for the Child Care Tax Credit. Information 
on child care expenditures coming from the tax files is likely to be more reliable than those 
obtained by direct interview because of recall problems of certain expenditures and of an 
uncertainty concerning the way in which the households take into account the government 
subsidies. In contrast, the tax data do not allow assessing the various child care arrangements to 
which the household resorts. Moreover, we do not have information on the number of hours of 
care, nor on the unit price of care arrangements. 
2.1 Sample selection 
Our field of investigation consists of couples having at least one child under the age of 7 (i.e., 
born in 1991 or afterwards). Child care expenditures of households having only older children are 
far lower because schooling is mandatory for children over 6 years old in France. 
We focus on formal (paid and not underground) child care arrangements outside the 
household’s home (mainly day-care centers and childminders in their home). The income tax 
return also contains information about wages paid by the household to employees working at the 
household’s home. However, no information allows us to assess the precise nature of the services 
produced by these employees (taking care of children or housework for instance). We thus 
exclude from the sample households, which reported expenditures for an employee at home, 
exceed care expenditures outside the home. This exclusion results in slightly decreasing the 
average standard of living of the households and the share of the women working full-time. 
The joint modeling of the mothers’ labor supply and use of paid child care requires the 
construction of the budget constraint of the households, which involves the whole schedule of the 
tax and benefit system. We exclude nonmarried couples from our sample. Indeed, married 
couples fill in a joint tax return, whereas each partner of a nonmarried couple is a distinct fiscal 
unit. For nonmarried couples, children can be included in either tax returns, which involves 
                                                       
5 Recent descriptive studies of child care arrangements and labor supply of mothers in France include Flipo and 
Sédillot (2000) and Robert-Bobée (2002). Lanot and Robin (1997) estimate a structural model of female 
participation with variable participation costs. However, they model the tax system by piecewise linear constraints 
and do not take the welfare system into account. Guillot (1996) only crossed the two decisions without taking into 
account the fact that they may interfere, and his model cannot be used to estimated policies effects.   5
complex problems of optimization. This selection has about no effect on the characteristics of the 
sample. 
Working hours are known only for wage-earning women. This leads us to exclude self-
employed women (and also self-employed men). Women being teachers or professors are also 
excluded from the sample because of potentially significant measurement errors on their working 
time. Indeed, they seem frequently to declare a weekly duration of work which corresponds only 
to teaching hours. Keeping those observations would bring us to consider them as working part-
time, whereas the majority of them indeed work full-time. These exclusions lead to decrease the 
proportion of high educated women in the sample. 
Eventually, to be consistent with our theoretical framework, we delete from the sample 
the couples in which the wife’s calculated hourly wage is below the legal minimum wage (Smic). 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of our initial sample and the effects of the successive 
selections described above. 
 
Table 1 : Effects of the Sample Selection on Some Variables 







Teachers   Households 
using mostly  











Sample size  4 375  3 732  3 508  3 397  2 758  2 655 
Mother’s occupational status and working time (in %)  
Self-employed 5.4  ///  /// ///  ///  /// 
Not working  46.0  48.3  50.2  51.3  51.9  54.2 
Working half-time  9.8  10.0  8.0  7.9  7.9  6.8 
Working 80% part-time  10.4  11.0  10.5  10.3  10.2  9.9 
Working full-time  28.5  30.7  31.3  30.5  30.0  29.1 
Mother’s educational level (in %) 
< baccalaureat  59.2  61.3  64.9  66.9  66.0  65.7 
Baccalaureat 15.1  15.0  15.6  15.6  15.9  16.0 
Baccalaureat+2 14.9  14.1  13.0  12.2  12.6  12.8 
Higher level  10.7  9.6  6.5  5.3  5.6  5.6 
Mean equivalent income in euros per year, 1997 
 14,430  14,120  13,800  13,380  13,530  13,600 
Main paid care arrangement* (in %) 
Paid care outside the 
parental home 
24.2 24.9  24.0  24.8  24.3 24.1 
Paid care at home  5.2  3.8  3.3  ///  ///  /// 
Average annual care expenditures for households using paid care arrangements (euros) 
Paid care outside the 
parental home 
1,130 1,140  1,150  1,140  1,140 1,150 
Paid care at home  4,750  4,590  4,700  ///  ///  /// 
Source: Insee and Fiscal Services 1997 Labor-Force-tax Return matched survey 
 
2.2 Construction of the endogenous variables 
We define the situation of the woman on the labor market in 1997 as the occupation most 
frequently reported during the year. For employed women, we retain as working time the average 
of the usual working hours reported in March 1997 and March 1998 in the Labor Force Survey
6. 
                                                       
6 Child care expenditures contained in the tax returns refer to the whole 1997 year.   6
The empirical distribution of the hours worked by working women has three peaks (Figure 1), 
roughly corresponding to half-time work, 80 % part-time, and full time. Subsequently, we build 
four categories of working time, [0, 15], ]15, 25], ]25, 34], and more than 34, referred to hereafter 
as 0, 20, 30, 39. 
An important methodological choice relates to the measurement of the women’s wage. 
We compute it indirectly from the tax files information, as the ratio of the salary income declared 
in the tax return to the number of working hours calculated from the Labor Force Survey because 
this method ensures consistency of wage incomes with child care expenditures, since both 
quantities come from the same source. In contrast, measuring hourly wages from the Labor Force 
Survey has the advantage of being less subject to measurement errors, but destroys the 
consistency between wage income and child care expenditures. As our modeling strategy relies 
heavily on the use of the household’s budget constraint, we choose to use the tax files 
information. 
 
Figure 1 : Distribution of Weekly Hours for Employed Women   
Source: Insee and Fiscal Services 1997 Labor-Force-tax Return matched survey 
2.3 Some descriptive analysis 
25% of the households used formal paid child care in 1997. This proportion is higher for 
households with children under 3 (29%). The choice of paid child care arrangements is strongly 
correlated to the women’s status on the labor market. 46% of the households in which the woman 
works (respectively 60% of the households with children under 3) use paid child care, versus 4% 
only when the woman does not work. The proportion of women using paid child care increases 
with the working time of the mother. 
The absence of declared child care expenditures on the tax return in a given year does not 
mean that the household does not use any paid child care arrangement: 15% of the households 
having children under 3 years old resort exclusively to unpaid care arrangements (Flipo and 
Sédillot, 2000) and some households may use informal paid child care. This observability issue 
will be dealt with in section 4. 
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Among households who use formal paid child care, the average per year net expenditure 
(after subsidy but before any tax cut) is about 1,100 euros (1,400 euros for households with 
children under 3 and 700 euros for households with only children aged 3 to 6). It increases with 
increasing working hours and on average the tax credit represents 16% of declared expenditures. 
Nearly 60 % of the households report less than 1,000 euros per year (after subsidy but before any 
tax cut expenditures). This figure reaches 75 % for households having only children from 3 to 6 
years old. These relatively low expenditures reflect the high level of schooling among children 
aged 3 to 6. Use of paid care arrangements in this case is likely to correspond to temporary 
accommodation of the children before or after school hours. 52% of the women in our sample did 
not work during the year 1997 (Table 2). This proportion is higher among low-skilled women: 
60% for women who did not complete high school, 34% for women having a diploma equal to or 
higher than Bac+2. Graduate women also more often work part-time. 
 
Table 2 : Female Working Time and Paid 
Care Use (In %) 
Figure 2 : Female Hourly Wages in 1997,  by Working Time 
 Households  with 
children under 7 
Households with 
children under 3 








Full-time workers  14.7  9.9 
All 75.7  71.1 








Full-time workers  15.3  18.1 





euros per  hour
Half-time 80% part-time 
Full time




Source: Insee and Fiscal Services 1997 Labor-Force-tax Return matched survey 
 
The mean hourly wages vary between working hours brackets (figure 2). On average, 
part-time women working more than one half-time receive 8.1 euros per hour of work, versus 7.7 
euros per hour for full-time women and 7.4 euros per hour for women working half-time. This 
can reflect selection of women with different characteristics into different classes of hours
7. 
Figure 2 also clearly shows that the dispersion of hourly wages is higher for part-time workers 
than for full-time workers. The value 4,57 on the x-axis represents the hourly Smic in Euros. For 
a small proportion of women (about 5%), the computed hourly wage is lower than the Smic. As 
indicated above, these women are deleted from our final sample. 
                                                       
7 It might also reflect differing uses of part-time jobs between sectors. 
 
4.57 euros corresponds to the value of the hourly minimum 
wage in France in 1997.   8
3 Provisions related to child care in the French tax and 
benefit system 
This section is devoted to the presentation of the French tax and welfare systems, in relation to 
the subsidy of child care costs and the incentives for mothers of young children to reduce their 
labor supply. The first subsection presents the main provisions of the system in 1997. The second 
subsection discusses the precise modeling of the budget constraint of the households, which is the 
most important feature of our model. 
3.1 Fiscal and welfare provisions related to child care 
We focus on formal paid care outside the parental home (section 2). Child care expenditures 
outside home (net of subsidies) directly reduce the tax liability of households, provided the 
parents work at least half-time. The corresponding nonrefundable tax credit (which we will call 
CCTC hereafter, by analogy with the U.S. CDCTC) is worth 25% of the annual child care 
expenditures, within the limit of 2287 euros per child. The maximum annual tax cut is thus 572 
euros per child between 0 and 6 years old. 
In the French context, the two main collective care arrangements used are daycare centers 
and care by childminders outside parents’ home (childminders in their home). Care in day-care 
centers is best described as a rationed good. Rationing is in general solved for by not admitted 
children if the mother does not work and by firstly serving women who work full-time, the others 
being supposed to be able to resort more easily to other child care arrangements. Households 
having a child admitted in a day-care center pay according to a scale that decreases with the size 
of the family and increases with its income, and varies from a municipality to another. For 
households at the top of the scale, the expenditure per child in a day-care center represents only 
about half the real cost of the care (Leprince, 2003). The difference between the operating costs 
of day-care centers and the sums paid by the households using them is financed in part by the 
state, in part by local jurisdictions and in part by the municipalities in which they are located. 
In contrast, there seems to be a (highly subsidized) market for care by childminders in 
their home. Households with children under 7 years old
8
 resorting to a childminder may benefit 
from the Afeama (Assistance to Families for the Employment of Childminders in their home). 
This subsidy consists of the total reimbursement of social contributions on the childminder’s 
wages to the household, plus a monthly allowance
9. 
Parents who stop working or work part-time after the birth of their second (or more) child 
may benefit from the APE (Parental Allowance for Education). Eligibility conditions include 
having worked more than 2 years during the 5 years (respectively 10 years) preceding the birth of 
the second (respectively third) child. APE consists in an allowance given until the child reaches 
the age of 3. The amount of the allowance takes different values depending on working time 
(complete stop of work, half-time jobs, 50% to 80% part-time jobs). The monthly amounts are 
respectively approximately 460, 305 and 230 euros. Only 1% of the 0.5 recipients are men. 
 
                                                       
8  As school is mandatory for children aged 6 or more, most of the benefits and subsidies related to children 
incorporate this age as an eligibility condition. 
9 The amount of the allowance depends on the age of the child and, since January 2001, from the resources of the 
household. In July 1997, the monthly amount of the subsidy was 124 euros per child less than 3 years old, and 62 
euros per child from 3 to 6 years old. About 0.4 million households benefit from this subsidy.    9
These three subsidies represent a significant budgetary cost for the state: 1.2 billion euros 
for the Afeama, 0.15 billion euros for the CCTC, and 2.5 billion euros for the APE, for the year 
1997 which is the relevant one for our study. 
3.2 The households’ budget constraint 
As the whole French tax and benefit system is very complex, we model only the provisions which 
are most likely to influence the households’ decisions of labor supply and child care (see Laroque 
and Salanié, 2002, for a complete description of the tax and benefit system and the related 
incentives). These include the whole income tax schedule, the minimum income programme 
(RMI), which consists in granting the difference between minimum income thresholds 
(depending on family structures) and total household resources if they don’t reach this minimum, 
family benefits (not means-tested ones granted to family with at least 2 children and means-tested 
ones, such as the allowance for young children -APJE-) and the APE. 
We do not take into account housing benefits, property taxes, unemployment benefits, and 
social contributions on wages. The reason for not modeling the first three items is that we lack 
relevant information in our dataset. Property taxes are unlikely to play a major role in the issues 
we examine here. Neglecting the other two items deserves some discussion. Unemployment 
benefits schedules depend on the past history of work (past wages, past hours of work, tenure), 
which are not known in our data. They decrease overtime, falling to zero after at most 2 years 
after the end of the last employment spell. However, in the static setting considered here, 
unemployment benefits could influence the choices of work of women
10. Neglecting them is 
likely to result in undervaluing the non-working states, resulting in biased estimation of 
preferences for leisure. 
Neglecting housing benefits may be the most prejudicial shortcoming in our context. 
Indeed, housing benefits depend negatively on the household’s total income. Thus, they 
contribute to raise the marginal tax rate on labor income. 
Finally, the choice not to model social contributions on wages is dictated both by the 
concern of avoiding to make the model more complex, and by the fact that taking them into 
account would not allow us to estimate the macroeconomic cost of policy reforms. This is 
because computing the cost of a particular reform would imply assessing the changes in the 
subsidies received by households. Those subsidies vary with the child care arrangements chosen, 
and any policy reform will cause changes in the choices of arrangements. Since our data do not 
allow us to model this choice, the component of the cost of a reform due to changes in the 
relative use of different care arrangements cannot be computed. 
To sum up, the resources taken into account in this paper are net wages
11, and net child 
care expenditures (i.e. after-subsidy, but before-tax). 
To illustrate some relevant features of the tax and benefit system, we consider some 
stylized cases of couples, differing by the number of children, the husband’s annual income, the 
hourly wage of the wife, and the household’s monthly child care expenditures. In each case, for 
the four different options of female working time, Table 3 gives the net resources, the incidence 
of RMI, the amount of APE, and the CCTC tax cut. We do not illustrate the budget constraints 
using traditional curves, as the choice of working hours is not continuous here. 
 
                                                       
10 The unemployment benefits of men are accounted for in our framework, since the total resources of men are taken 
to be exogenous, see below. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   11
In the population we study, the RMI does not play a very significant role. Indeed, 95% of the 
sample men are employees (the 5% remainders are unemployed) and 48% of the households are 
eligible for the APE. Very often, the sum of the husband’s wage and the family benefits exceed 
the ceiling of the RMI. In case 1, the household is not eligible for the APE and gets the RMI 
when the woman works part-time. In case 4, the annual wage of the husband approximately 
corresponds to half of the Smic (legal minimum wage) and the household benefits from RMI 
when the woman does not work. The other cases illustrate the various effects of the CCTC. 
CCTC cannot decrease with increasing working time of the mother, but can reach the ceiling 
rather quickly. In case 2, the tax cut is equal to 25% of child care expenditures. In case 5, annual 
child care expenditures exceed 2287 euros per child. In case 3, the ceiling is never reached and 
the CCTC makes the household nontaxable even when the mother works full-time. In case 6, the 
husband’s income is higher and the tax cut is not sufficiently large to make the household 
nontaxable when the woman works full-time. In certain cases, the net resources of the household 
may not increase with the working hours of the woman. For example in case 5, the resources are 
higher at 30 hours than at 39 hours, because the loss of the APE and the increase of taxes more 
than compensate the increase in woman’s labor income. 
4 The model 
As mentioned above, our data contain the same information on child care as those used by Ribar 
(1995), i.e., formal child care expenditures. Nothing is known of the precise care arrangement 
used, or of informal care expenditures. Moreover, we cannot break down care expenditures into 
quantities (hours of care) and prices (unit prices of care hours). Thus, it is not possible to estimate 
a marshallian demand function for hours of care. We have to make an identifying assumption as 
regards the demand for formal care. Although our theoretical model appears to differ from 
Ribar’s one, it leads to an econometric specification very similar to his. 
4.1 The theoretical framework 
The labor supply of the man is taken to be exogenous, as the adjustments of working time mostly 
concern women. The woman can choose to work or not, as well as hours of work when she 
works. The household can use formal paid care arrangements or alternative arrangements, 
including care by the mother, another person, or informal paid care. 
Preferences of the family depend on the consumption c of a composite good taken as the 
numéraire and on the leisure time of the woman,  h T L − =  where h is the woman’s number of 
hours worked. 
We make two simplifying assumptions due to the lack of data on child care hours. We 
first assume that the family needs a certain amount of child care hours Q , which is exogenous 
and depends only on the family structure. This quantity of child care is produced by two inputs, 
the leisure time of the mother, L, and formal hours of care, G . The family has to produce a 
certain amount of care:  
Q X G L Q = ) , , (    (1) 
where  X  is a vector of exogenous variables, which affect the easiness to use informal care 
arrangements, such as the proximity of parents or relatives. 
Conditional on the mother’s hours of work, the relation 1 can be written: 
) , , ( X Q L g G =    (2)   12
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where w denotes the hourly wage of the woman, N denotes exogenous income, including wage 
income of the husband, d(G) denotes formal child care expenditure and T is the tax paid net of 
social transfers. Note that T depends on formal care expenditures because of the CCTC.  
 
At this stage, we introduce a change in the model, in order to account for informal care 
expenditures, which are not observed. Informal care expenditures affect the budget constraint 
both directly and indirectly, because using informal care may have costs in time or in kind to the 
household. We account for this by letting F = 1G>0, the dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the chosen care arrangement is formal, 0 otherwise, enter the utility function, which becomes 
U(C, L, F). This technique is also used by Ribar (1995)
12. 
4.2 Econometric specification 
We specify a quadratic form for the utility function. 
fh h ch c f h c f h c U fh hh ch cc f h β β β β β β + + + + + + = 2 2 ) , , (
~
       (3) 
Unobserved heterogeneity is introduced both in the coefficients of the preference function 
and in the wage and child care expenditure equations. Coefficients  h β and  f β are random: 
f f f f







  (4a and 4b) 
 
The coefficients  fh hh ch cc β β β β , , , depend only on observed characteristics of the 
households.  
The inclusion of a cross effect  h f .  in the utility function aims at reflecting possibly 
different attractiveness of formal paid care arrangements depending on the working time of the 
mother. Indeed, the supply of care services is not completely flexible with respect to the mother’s 
schedule of work. The  h f .  term can also help to control for effects, which are not strictly related 
to the households’ preferences. In particular, sometimes the choice of care modes can be 
conditional on the situation of the mother on the labor market because of rationing issues (see 
section 3.1). This concern leads us to adopt an even more flexible specification, which consists in 
including three different terms  39 30 20 39 , 30 , 20 f f f .f. .f. .f. β β β   in the utility function in place of 
fh fh β . The explanatory regressors are the same for the three coefficients: a constant and the 
number of children under 3 when the model is estimated on the sample of households with 
children under the age of 7.  
                                                       
12 An alternative choice would be to proceed like Heckman (1974) and model formal and informal care prices as 
functions of observed and unobserved characteristics of the household.   13
 
Unobserved heterogeneity also concerns wages and child care expenditures. The hourly 











  (4c and 4d) 
Hours of work intervene as regressors in the expenditure equation. The relation between 
hours worked and child care expenditure is very flexible (in particular it is not necessarily linear). 
In contrast, for the sake of simplicity, we choose not to include working hours as regressors in the 
wage equation (for this modeling choice, see for example Laroque and Salanié, 2000) nor in the 
variance of  w σ .  
 
The four residuals of the model are supposed jointly normal, with mean 0 and covariance 




The model is identified by the normalization of the coefficient of c in the utility function 
and by multiple non-linearities in the budget constraint. In addition, we make several exclusion 
restriction assumptions. 
 
Estimating the model requires taking account of the nonconvexity of the households’ 
budget constraint, which results from the complexity of the tax-benefit system. There are 8 
possible states, which result from the combination of the four choices for working hours (see 
section 2) with the dummy for using formal paid care. As in Keane and Moffitt (1998), the 
estimation relies then on the direct comparison of the household’s utility levels in the eight 
situations. An important exception concerns women whose estimated productivity is lower than 
the hourly Smic. We suppose that these women cannot work. Their choice is thus limited to the 
decision to use formal paid care or not while not working (see Appendix B for details). 
4.3 Labor demand and child care supply constraints 
Our model supposes that participation and hours can be freely chosen, which may seem too 
strong an assumption. In our sample, a huge majority of the women who did not work during the 
year 1997 declare themselves as housewives, and not searching for a job. However, the share of 
mothers who do not work is definitely higher among the less educated women, which may be an 
indication that non-participation could be constrained. However, our model incorporates the 
(arguably) most important constraint on labor supply, in the form of the minimum wage. Having 
a productivity lower than the minimum wage (Smic) hinders women from working. As this 
truncation effect is expected to bear mostly on low-qualified women, one can think that a good 
share of the constraints on labor supply is taken into account. Other factors could of course play a 
role. To reflect the idea that a high local rate of unemployment can dissuade some women to 
search for a job, we introduce the local unemployment rate among the regressors of the 
preferences for work coefficient  h β
14. 
                                                       
13 We use the parameterization Σ  = CC’, where C is triangular, and do not impose any constraint on the coefficients 
of the Choleski matrix C. 
14 The unemployment rate is calculated at the Departement area level. There are 95 Departements in France.   14
Concerning the choice of working hours when the woman works, it is difficult to know if 
the observed choices are constrained by the local demand for part-time jobs
15. However, 
according to the Labor Force Survey, the share of women working part-time who declare they 
would be willing to work more is definitely lower among young mothers (25%) than among the 
whole female population (33 %). A frequently used means of taking these constraints into 
account is to introduce exogenous probabilities of success in finding a job of a certain type, 
conditional on wanting a job of that type (Choné, 2002). Given the already complex nature of the 
model, we do not follow this way. Also, not taking constraints on hours into account may be less 
unrealistic in our context of discrete choice of working hours (four brackets) than in a context of 
continuous distribution for supplied hours.  
Supply constraints on the care market may concern the local provision of care services 
(existence of day-care centers, of alternative formal care arrangements in the community of 
residence of the family), or the existence of alternative care arrangements (e.g. having relatives 
nearby). We have no direct information on this point. We take this fact into account in the 
specification of the preferences. We also introduce two explanatory variables. The first one is an 
indicator summarizing the supply-side situation as regards child care
16. It is included in both the 
regressors of the preference for paid child care  f β and the regressors of the care expenditures 
equation. The other one is a dummy variable indicating whether the couple lives in the 
department of birth of one of its two members. It is introduced in the expenditure equation, to 
mitigate the absence of direct information on the spatial proximity of parents and relatives who 
could take care of the children. 
4.4 Structure of the model and likelihood 
The majority of studies proceed in several stages, initially estimating wage and expenditure 
equations, then in a second stage the coefficients of the discrete-choice model. This kind of 
method generates consistency problems between the first stage reduced-form equations and the 
decision model estimated in the second stage, as the equations estimated in the first stage are not 
the true reduced-form of the complete model. A contribution of this work is the simultaneous 
estimation of all equations, which in particular allows us to take into account correlations 
between unobserved tastes and the residuals of the wage and expenditure equations. The model is 
estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using GHK-type methods (Appendix A). 
The likelihood contributions differ according to whether the woman works or not and uses 
paid child care or not. According to the case, we observe the wage and expenditures, one of those 
quantities only, or none of them. Moreover, calculation is further complicated by the inclusion of 
a minimum wage. The contributions of the observations to the likelihood in the various cases are 
presented in Appendix B. 
Once estimated the parameters of the model, simulations of policy reforms can be 
implemented. We draw residuals and simulate the endogenous variables of the model (wages, 
expenditure, levels of utility, and finally the states before and after the reform). This method 
allows one to construct matrices of transition between states caused by the reform in order to 
                                                       
15 Part-time jobs are more frequent in the service sector than in industry sector. Part-time jobs could also be more 
costly to firms, because of the tax system. See Del Boca (2002) for a discussion of the Italian case on this topic. 
 
16 This variable is constructed as follows: we first add the capacities in day-care centers and the number of children 
kept by childminders, at the Departement level. Then we divide this number by the number of children aged 1, 2 or 3 
in the same area.   15
analyze switches between states due to the reform and to estimate mean elasticities computed as 
the ratios of the relative changes in the dependent variables to the change in the appropriate 
parameter of the model. To analyze changes in working hours due to the reforms, it is useful to 
decompose changes in the total amount of hours worked between an extensive effect, which is 
here due to switches between participation and non participation, and an intensive effect, which is 
here the change in the total amount of working hours for women who work before and after the 
reform. 
5 Results 
The model is estimated on two fields: the complete sample of families with children less than 7 
years old (2655 observations) and the subsample of families with at least one child under 3 (1296 
observations). Indeed, we expect to find higher elasticities of participation and paid care use for 
families with young children, given that child care expenditures are higher for them. This 
estimation on two different subsamples is also a means of assessing the robustness of the results, 
by comparing the figures resulting from the two models on their common field of families with 
children under 3. For all the specifications we use, the results from the two models are very close, 
both in terms of transitions between states and as regards estimated elasticities. Our results thus 
seem relatively robust. Therefore we only present and discuss results from the model estimated 
on the full sample (Table 4). 
5.1 Coefficient estimates 
As usual in female labor supply analysis, the hourly wages increase with educational level and 
professional experience, and are higher in the Paris area than in the province (Table 4). The child 
care expenditure equation is trickier to implement in a satisfactory way
17. Despite numerous 
alternative specifications, we were not able to reduce the standard deviation of the expenditure 
residual significantly. The point estimate for this standard error is 1.34, which reflects the great 
variability of the households’ care expenditures, even after controlling for observed 
characteristics. It is quite difficult to analyze directly the coefficients of the expenditure equation 
because working hours are included as regressors and because of correlations between 
unobserved heterogeneity terms in the expenditure equation and preference for paid child care 
and hours of work. The negative values for the working hours may seem inadequate. We have 
checked that, conditional on the use of paid child care and working hours, child care expenditures 
increase with increasing working time. Two exogenous parameters have the expected sign: child 
care expenditures decrease with increasing child care supply and are higher in Paris. 
Turning to the preference coefficients, utility is concave in consumption and hours of 
work. In particular, the marginal utility of income is decreasing. The aversion for work at zero 
hours of work (equal to - h β  see equation (3)), increases with the number of children, but 
decreases with age. It is higher for foreigners, and for women living in areas where the 
unemployment rate is high. Lastly, when the husband works over 45 hours a week, the wife 
wants to work less. The coefficient for the preference to formal paid care  f β  is higher when the  
 
                                                       
17 The fact that this equation is difficult to estimate is common. Guillot (1996) finds a R² of only 0.097 for his 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   17
husband is high educated and when the household lives in urban areas. It increases with local 
child care supply. But the standard error for unobserved heterogeneity is high, which may partly 
stems for a lack of data on the specific care arrangement chosen and hours of child care. 
The three coefficients  fh β are all positive and increasing with the number of children 
under 3. In the field of households with children of less than 7 years, a Wald test and a likelihood 
ratio test lead to reject the equality of the coefficients  39 30 20 , , f f f γ γ γ at the 10% level. 
On the six correlations between the residuals of the model, only two appear not significant 
(the correlations between the wages and the expenditure residuals, and between the wages and the 
preferences for the use of paid child care). The correlation between the residuals of the 
expenditure equation and of the preferences for the use of paid child care is strongly negative, 
which conforms to intuition (households increase their use of paid care if expenditures are 
lower)
18.  
The model reproduces the observed situations relatively well. The fit of the discrete 
probabilities (Table 5) is satisfactory and the predicted frequencies for each state remain close to 
those actually observed when we break the sample down by age of the children and education 
level of the mothers. 
 
Table 5: Fit of the Model estimated on the Full Sample 
in % 













All households with children under 7 
Observed   23.6  45.8  7.0  10.0  28.7 
Simulated   24.2  46.7  8.9  8.9  28.9 
Households with children under 3 
Observed   27.2  40.1  5.6  7.8  25.9 
Simulated   27.4  41.6  7.5  9.3  24.8 
 
5.2 Elasticities of participation and paid care use 
All the elasticities are gathered in Table 6. 
 
We firstly uniformly increase the hourly wages of women by 10 %. Female employment then 
increases strongly by +3.8 points (Table 7). Both full-time and part-time work increase strongly. 
Reduction of supplied hours in response to a wage increase is very rare in the sample. The total 
number of hours worked increases by 10.5 %, of which a third is due to an increase in supplied 
hours of women who worked before the reform, and two thirds is due to greater participation. 
This rise of employment coincides with a rise in the use of paid child care: +1.7 points (2.1 points 
for the families with children under 3). 
 
                                                       
18 The estimated values of the correlations are robust to all alternative specifications and estimations on different 
fields. That shows that a priori assumptions one could make about the correlation structure in such a model are not 
well founded. Also, the fact that correlations between preferences on one hand, wages and expenditures on the other 
hand, are not zero justifies the need for joint estimation of all the equations of the model. 
   18
The corresponding elasticity of female participation is 0.80 (0.91 for families with children of 
less than 3 years old) (see table 6). The wage elasticity of paid care use amounts to 0.70. This last 
elasticity is higher than those usually found in American data. This result is due to the way one 
takes into account the censorship of the minimum wage. Indeed, if we also increase the Smic by 
10%, the two elasticities are divided by about two. In this case, the women whose estimated 
productivity is below the Smic are the same before and after the reform: the wage increase does 
not have any impact on the choices of these women, since they cannot find a job in both cases. 
 
Table 6 : Uncompensated Elasticities and Effects of the Minimum Wage 
 Households  with 
children under 7 
Households with children under 3 
 
Elasticity of paid care utilization  
Care expenditure  -.29  -.31 
Wage *  .70  .77 
Wage, minimum wage 
increased** 
.33 .35 
Income -.02  -.00 
Elasticity of female participation  
Care expenditure  -.01  -.01 
Wage *  .80  .91 
Wage, minimum wage 
increased** 
.30 .33 
Income -.18  -.18 
Elasticity of worked hours 
Care expenditure  -.01  -.02 
Wage *  1.05  1.20 
Wage, minimum wage 
increased** 
.26 .29 
Income -.19  -.19 
Number of observations   2655  1296 
* : All female wages increased by 10%, no change in the minimum wage.  
** :  All female wages increased by 10%, minimum wage increased by 10 %. 
 
To obtain income elasticities, we simulate a uniform increase of men’s wages by 10%. The 
corresponding transition matrix (not shown) indicates that the overall effect is a fall in female 
labor supply. But the effects differ following the initial labor supply of women. Whereas 9% of 
the women working 20 hours in the benchmark case would stop to work, hardly any woman 
working 30 hours in the benchmark case would stop participating. Instead, those women tend to 
reduce their hours supply to 20 hours (7% of them). A few women working full-time would 
reduce their working hours to 30 hours, but again hardly any would choose not to work. Overall, 
the implied elasticities of participation and hours worked are respectively -.18 and -.19. The 
former figure is in the range of previous estimates in other countries (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 
1999). It is a little higher in absolute value than the estimate in Laroque and Salanié (2002), who 
study the labor supply of French women but do not consider child care. Paid care utilization 
would slightly decrease by .1 point. In fact, two opposite effects are at work here. On one hand, 
since women tend to reduce their labor supply, fewer of them need to use paid care. On the other 
hand, the income rise has a positive effect on the demand for paid child care. Overall, these two 
effects cancel out, in spite of the non negligible reduction of female labor supply. 
   19
Since our data do not allow us to break down child care expenditures into price and 
quantities, we cannot calculate true elasticities of the demand for child care. We measure the 
sensitivity of labor supply and child care use by simulating an exogenous 10% increase in child 
care expenditures. As table 7 shows, the impact on the overall participation rate of women is 
small (-0.04 point). The change is a little stronger for mothers of children under 3. Adjustments 
of working time are also small in magnitude. Half-time employment increases slightly, whereas  
 
Table 7: Employment and Care Utilization Effects of Simulated Policy Changes 
(Differences between the probabilities before and after the change)  











All households with children under 7 
Increase female hourly wages by 
10%, no change in the minimum 
wage    1.7 3.8  0.9  0.8  2.1 
Increase female hourly wages and 
minimum wage by 10%  0.8  1.4  0.5  0.4  0.5 
Increase child care expenditures 
by 10%   -0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Eliminate tax credit  -1.3  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Double care expenditures   -5.5  -0.3  0.3  -0.2  -0.4 
Eliminate all the Ape program  1.4  2.5  0.7  -1.1  2.9 
Eliminate the Ape for the second 
child only   1.1  1.8  0.4  -1.0  2.3 
Eliminate the Ape for part-time 
women only  0.0  -2.2  -3.3  -1.8  2.9 
Extend the APE to women with 
only one child   -0.6 -0.8  -0.1  1.0  -1.6 
 
Households with children under 3 
Increase female hourly wages by 
10%, no change in the minimum 
wage    2.1 3.8  0.9  0.9  2.1 
Increase female hourly wages and 
minimum wage by 10%  0.9  1.4  0.5  0.4  0.5 
Increase child care expenditures 
by 10%   -0.8  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.0 
Eliminate tax credit  -1.4  -0.1  0.2  -0.1  -0.1 
Double care expenditures   -6.5  -0.4  0.5  -0.5  -0.5 
Eliminate all the Ape program  2.4  4.0  1.1  -1.7  4.5 
Eliminate the Ape for the second 
child only   1.8  2.8  0.7  -1.4  3.5 
Eliminate the Ape for part-time 
women only  -0.1  -3.2  -4.8  -2.9  4.5 
Extend the APE to women with 
only one child   -0.9 -1.2  -0.2  1.4  -2.5 
 
 
the other choices of hours become less frequent. The corresponding elasticities of participation 
and working hours are practically zero. The effects on the use of formal paid child care are 
somewhat bigger. Formal paid care use decreases by 0.7 point, meaning an elasticity of -0.29. 
Among the women who change their (h, f) combination after the reform, 57% do not change their 
working time but cease to use paid care, and 34% both decrease their working hours and stop   20
using paid child care. Overall, the elasticities we find in this simulation exercise are a little lower 
than those given by Ribar (1995). 
6 Some policy simulations 
The programs designed to help families with young children are multiple and may be expected to 
have quite diverse effects on the labor supply of women and on the use of paid child care. While 
programs like the Afeama and the CCTC aim at reducing the cost of child care and perhaps 
allowing young mothers to continue to work, the APE was initially designed to encourage low-
productivity women to withdraw from the labor market. This study tries to assess the effects of 
each type of program on the female labor supply and the use of formal paid child care in France. 
The first simulation consists in modifying the schedule of the CCTC. The second consists in 
doubling the before-tax child care expenditures of the households. Lastly, we change the schedule 
of the APE. The size of the French CCTC is relatively modest compared to that of the APE. 
Thus, in the sequel we spend more time on the third set of results than on the first. Recall that due 
to the data available, the present study only examines paid care arrangements outside the parental 
home. In consequence, we cannot simulate reforms devoted to child care arrangement in parents’ 
home, nor assess the impact of a change in the CCTC schedule in the use of care at home by the 
households. 
6.1 Modifying the CCTC schedule 
The CCTC results on average in a 16% cut in the expenditures of households using paid child 
care. Merely suppressing the CCTC would result in a weak reduction in total female participation 
(-0.1 point), women leaving the labor market stopping to use formal paid care. Women also tend 
to decrease their working hours in order to lower care expenditures. The fall in overall female 
participation breaks down into a rise of part-time employment and a greater fall for the others 
types of work (table 7). Paid care use decreases by 1.3 points. Another simulation consisting in 
increasing the subsidy rate of CCTC from 25% to 50% results in a slight increase in total female 
participation and a bigger increase in paid care use. 
6.2 Doubling child care expenditures 
Doubling before-tax child care expenditures is not economically meaningless in the French 
context, since a very significant share of child care expenditures is covered by subsidies. For 
instance, doubling the care expenditures of households using care by a childminder would 
approximately amount to dividing by two the amount of the Afeama, which would still leave an 
important part of the gross expenditure to the Welfare Bureau and the local communities. 
Doubling the care expenditures magnifies the effects put into evidence above. Total 
female participation decreases by 0.3 point (table 7). The number of hours worked drops more 
strongly : -2%, of which 1% is due to women who stop working and 1% is due to changes of 
working hours of employed women. Using paid care decreases by 5.5 points. Average annual 
care expenditures for households who utilize formal paid care would raise to 1,820 euros after the 
reform, against 1,280 euros before the reform
19. 
                                                       
19  As usual in models with selection, this figure combines two effects. Faced with a rise in child care costs, 
households who still use paid care after the reform try to lower hours of child care (in our model, they may only do   21
6.3 Modifying the APE schedule 
The amount of the APE is higher, the less the parent work (see section 3.1). These financial 
incentives have a strong influence over the working hours of mothers of young children. The 
benefit is granted until the child reaches the age of 3. Thus, in this subsection, we focus on 
families having children under 3. 
According to the model, the suppression of APE would cause a rise of 4.5 points of full-
time work, a rise of 4 points of female participation, and an increase of 2.4 points of paid care use 
(see the transition matrix in table 8). The transitions on the labor market take the form of 
numerous shifts toward immediately higher hours brackets. Theses shifts results in a 11% rise of 
total worked hours, 44% of which comes from increases in hours from women who participated 
before the reform, and 56% from women (re)entering the labor market. 
We simulate the reverse natural experiment of the 1994 extension of the APE to parents of 
2 children, by removing the APE for families with exactly two children including at least one 
under 3. The participation rate of the concerned women would jump from 44 to 50%, and the 
number of worked hours would increase by 16% (tables 7 and 8). Thus, 11% of non participating 
women would take up a job. This figure is slightly lower but of the same order as that put 
forward by Piketty (1998). This comforts us in the robustness of our other findings.  
The choice of working hours is very sensitive to financial incentives (tables 7 and 8). The 
suppression of the APE for women working 80% part-time would result in a strong decrease in 
this type of work. Only 3% of the mothers of children under 3 would work 80% part-time after 
the reform versus 9% before the reform. Women in this hours bracket before the reform would 
switch equally to full-time or to half-time (the latter choice enabling them to benefit from half-
time APE). Only few women would stop working, even though they may benefit from APE by 
doing so. The effect of the reform on the total working time of women would be weak, the effects 
of switching towards half-time and full-time compensating one another. If we remove APE 
granted for half-time while maintaining the other forms of APE, 50% part-time work strongly 
decreases (2% of women versus 7% before the reform), two thirds of the concerned women 
switching to 80% and one third stopping to work. Female total employment would drop by 2 
points, but the number of hours worked would remain stable. Finally, suppressing all the part-
time APEs would result in both a lower participation rate and a rise in full-time work, because of 
numerous transfers of women currently working half-time to non-participation and women 
working 80% part-time towards full-time. Once again, these adjustments partly reflect differences 
in behavior between low-skilled, half-timer and high-skill, long part-timer women. These 
differences confirm the usefulness of distinguishing different hours brackets in the analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
so by switching to a lower hours bracket). At the same time, some ”marginal” households, presumably the ones who 
had the smaller care expenditures before the reform, will stop using paid care. 
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Table 8 : Transition Matrices 
(h denotes the number of female working hours per week, f denote paid care utilization )  
 
For households with children under the age of 3 
 
a) Eliminate all the whole Ape program 
Individuals in the row  (h, f)  change to states … 
  (0,0)  .  (30,0)  (39,0)  (0,1)  (20,1)  (30,1)  (39,1)  All 
(0,0)  92.9 4,4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.7 0.0  100.0 
(20,0)  1.0 66.0 21.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 6.9  5.0  100.0 
(30,0)  0.1  0.1 40.1 45.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.8  100.0 
(39,0)  0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
(0,1)  2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.8 4.9 0.0 0.0  100.0 
(20,1)  0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 66.3 33.1 0.1  100.0 
(30,1)  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 62.0  37.7  100.0 
(39,1)  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0  100.0 
 
 
b) Eliminate only the Ape for 80% part-time women 
Individuals in the row  (h, f)  change to states … 
  (0,0)  (20,0)  (30,0)  (39,0)  (0,1)  (20,1)  (30,1)  (39,1)  All 
(0,0)  100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
(20,0)  0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
(30,0)  0.0 40.0 18.0 34.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  8.0  100.0 
(39,0)  0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
(0,1)  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
(20,1)  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
(30,1)  0.2 10.9  0.0  0.0 0.0 23.3 34.0 31.6  100.0 
(39,1)  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0  100.0 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the joint decisions of labor supply and use of formal paid care 
arrangements by mothers of young children in France using a structural model inspired from 
Ribar (1995). Heterogeneity of the female labor force is clearly illustrated by simulations of 
economic policy. For example, women working half-time and women working 80% part-time 
appear to be very different. The first group of women would not participate if they could. When 
their income increase, they drop out of the labor force. In the second group, the choice of not 
working full-time seems more often to be the result from an optimization; would incentives to 
take part-time jobs disappear, these women would still participate and work full-time. 
The lessons from our simulated policy reforms are of several orders. Firstly, the 
suppression of the tax cut for child care (the French equivalent of the CDCTC) would have very 
limited effects on paid care use and on the total labor supply of mothers. Secondly, the 
suppression of the APE (or of part of it) would have huge effects on female labor supply and on 
paid care use. The simulation of policy reforms we undertake confirms the importance of 
modeling both the intensive and extensive decisions of labor supply to study those issues. 
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This study is not exempt from shortcomings, related both to the data we use and to the model we 
select. The principal limit imposed by the data is the absence of information on the volume of 
hours of child care, which prevents us from decomposing child care expenditures into prices and 
quantities, and finally to estimate a true demand function for hours of care. The expenditures we 
take into account are only a small fraction of this gross cost, and as a consequence it is not very 
surprising that the effects we uncover are weak. Another limit of the model, common to the 
majority of existing studies, is the absence of modeling the supply of child care services, and 
more generally of general equilibrium effects. In our framework, supply constraints are proxied 
by a local rate of equipment in day-care centers and childminders, but this variable is taken as 
exogenous. The fact that the greatest part of the gross expenditures of child care is paid by other 
actors than the households (the Government and municipalities mostly) has an effect on the 
supply of collective child care services (e.g. on the construction of new day-care centers). It is 
clear that the suppression of whole or part of these subsidies would have, beyond the effects 
highlighted here, also a negative aggregate effect on supply. 
Constraints on the job market are taken into account in the same way via the introduction 
of the local unemployment rate as an exogenous regressor in the coefficient of leisure in the 
utility function. However, we also consider unemployment as a potential consequence of 
insufficient productivity, via the introduction of the minimum wage, which, in this field of 
research, had never been done. 
Lastly, our model is static, although in many aspects both labor supply and use of paid 
child care can be thought of as dynamic processes. Moreover, independently of financial 
incentives, fertility decisions during the life cycle can introduce a dynamic aspect into the 
problem of labor supply of women. 
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APPENDIX 
In the sequel, ϕ  and Φdenote respectively the density and the cumulative density function (cdf) 
of the standard normal law, '2 and _2 denote the density and the cdf of the standard bivariate 
normal law. 
A Simulation method 
We use a straightforward extension of the GHK method (see e.g. Gouriéroux and Monfort, 1996, 
pages 98 and 105) which allows one to obtain an unbiased simulator of  ] 1 ) ( [ D v v h E ∈ , where h is 
an integrable function, D is a rectangular domain, and v is a normal vector with law N(0, Σ). 
 
In each of the eight possible states of the model, we denote Σ the variance of unobserved 
residuals conditional on the set of observed variables. Our generic problem
20 is to compute 
expectations of the type  ] 1 ) ( [ D v v h E ∈ , where v is a normal vector with law N(0, Σ), h is a given 
function easy to evaluate, and the domain D is defined by a system of constraints of the following 
type: 
). ( ) ( 1 2 2 1 2
1 1 1





In this system,  1 A  and  1 B  are constants, whereas  2 A  is a function of  1 v . Therefore, D is not a 
rectangular domain, but rather a lower triangular one. 
We denote C  the (lower triangular) Cholesky matrix of Σ (so that Σ= CC’). The vector 
u defined by  Cu v =  follows N(0, I). As C  is lower triangular, the preceding system of   
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These constraints define a domain 
∗ D in the  ) , ( 2 1 u u plane. Let us draw 
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s s u B u A . Then, an unbiased simulator of 
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Indeed, the joint density of  ) , ( 2 1
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have: 
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20 In this section, we work in dimension 2. The argument extends easily to higher dimensions. 
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If we drawS  realizations of the vector 
s u the expectation  ] 1 ) ( [ D v v h E ∈ is estimated as 










For the estimations presented in the text, we used  50 = S . In practice, we observed that 
beyond  20 = S , the results hardly vary with S . 
B Likelihood of the model 
In this section, we denote 
∗ w  and
∗ D as the variables describing wage and child care expenditure, 
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The utility of the household writes: 
, ) , , (







f f f f






The vector of the residuals ( h d f w ε ε ε ε , , , ) is supposed to be normal with mean zero and 
unrestricted covariance matrix Σ. 
  H can take only 4 values (0,20,30,39) and F can take only two values (0,1) so that 
crossing  f and h defines eight states: (0,0), (0,20), (0,30), (0,39), (1,0), (1,20), (1,30), (1,39). 
Wages are observed only when the woman works, and child care expenditures are 
observed only when the woman uses paid child care. 
The problem is to choose the state that maximizes households’ utility under the relevant 
budget constraint. Exceptions are women whose productivity is under the minimum wage who 
are set not to work. Their choice is limited to the states (0,0) and (0,1). The budget constraint 
depends, among other things, on the wage and the care expenditures. 
Denoting  hf U utility in state  ) , ( f F h H = = , we have  f h hf hf f h V U ε ε + + = . Then 
f h f h f h f
h h h
V U V U V U V U
V U V U V U V U
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε
+ + = + + = + + = + =
+ = + = + = =
39 30 20
39 30 20
39 , 1 39 , 1 30 , 1 30 , 1 20 , 1 20 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 1
39 , 0 39 , 0 30 , 0 30 , 0 20 , 0 20 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0
  Differences in the utility between states depend always on unobserved residuals between 
utility, which is consistent to our data: in the sample, the 8 states are possible, including the case 
to use paid child care while non-working
21. 
The utility level  0 , 0 V  does not contain unobserved residuals, and thus can be calculated 
once for all (conditional on the current value of the parameters) for all individuals of the sample. 
The other quantities  hf V  contain unobserved residuals, and have to be calculated within each 
simulation.  
                                                       
21 Ribar (1995) puts heterogeneity on the coefficients  fh β  and  h β . As a consequence,  1 , 0 0 , 0 U U − is not random 
and Ribar has to assume that the state (0,1) is impossible and to exclude such observations from the sample. 
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We denote by  w ε the (individual) value of  w ε such that the productivity of the woman 
calculated for this value of  w ε is equal to the minimum wage. 
The probabilities of the eight states  ) , ( f h  define domains like those introduced above in 
the description of the simulation method (Appendix A). 
 
State (0,0) 
In this state, as in state (0,1), the woman does not work. This may have two reasons: 
either her productivity is too low ( w w ε ε < ), or her productivity would allow her to work, but the 
(0,0) situation is optimal among the eight possible choices.  d ε and  w ε are not observed. The 
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States (20,0), (30,0) and (39,0) 
In the state (20,0), as in the states (30,0) and (39,0), the woman works but does not use paid child 
care. Thus,  d ε is unobserved,  w ε is known. The likelihood writes: 
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State (0,1) 
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1 , 0 0 , 39 0 , 30 0 , 20 0 , 0
1 , 39 1 , 0 1 , 30 1 , 0 1 , 20 1 , 0




States (20,1), (30,1) and (39,1) 
In these states, the woman works and uses paid child care. Then, for a given value of the 
parameters of the model, the residuals  w ε and  d ε are known, and the likelihood for the state 
(20,1) writes in the following manner: 
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1 , 20 0 , 39 0 , 30 0 , 20 0 , 0
1 , 39 1 , 20 1 , 30 1 , 20 1 , 20 1 , 0
1 , 20  
 
It is similar for the states (30,1) and (39,1). In those three cases, the probability involving the 
preference residuals can be written as one-dimensional integrals with respect to  h ε thanks to the 
conditioning properties of the normal law. These integrals are computed numerically using a 
Gauss-Legendre quadrature. For states (20,1) and (30,1), a problem can appear in the course of 
the maximization routine, because for a non-optimal value of the parameters, nothing guarantees 
that the integral bounds are correctly ordered. When this is not the case, negative probabilities 
show up. To bypass this difficulty, we choose to smooth the estimated probabilities by returning a 
very small positive number when the computed probability is negative, and (nearly) the 
computed value when it is positive. Near the optimum, the bounds are correctly ordered for all 
observations, and the smoothing has no effect. 
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